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Abstract 
This article presents an analysis of contemporary struggles over the use of 
pesticides in Malaysian agriculture. Drawing on Michel Foucault's 
genealogical analyses of power/knowledge relations in modem societies in 
general, and governmental rationalities evolving around the management of 
populations (bio-power) in particular, the article presents three main 
arguments. First, in order to tell the truth about pesticide poisoning one had 
to resort to medical and toxicological discourses which proved to be 
important for validating and invalidating claims made on the poisonous 
effects of pesticides. The possible modalities by which the use of pesticides 
could be contested were, in effect, technicalized and importantly restricted. 
Second, the attempts to govern and contest the use of pesticides on the 
grounds that it presented a threat to public health had as an important 
precondition the recasting of development discourse in Malaya between 
1945 and 1955. The associated transformation of public health policies, 
which implied that the promotion of the population's health standard 
became a domain for regulatory intervention, at one and the same time 
created a possibility to regulate and protest over the use of pesticides. Third 
and finally, contestation over the use of pesticides, on the basis that it 
presented a threat to public health, tended to be reduced to a conflict over 
the effectiveness and implementation of regulatory techniques. 
Introduction 
Contemporary Malaysia is witnessing a clash of conflicting 
rationalities related to modern forms of pest control. The undesirable 
side-effects of chemical pesticides, the use of which proliferated in 
Malaysian agriculture after World War 11, on human health and the 
environment were pointed out by crop protection scientists in the 
1960s. Although a legal framework was established in the early 
1970s to control the side-effects of pesticides by mandatory 
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registration and quality control, the public opposition to the use of 
pesticides continued and from around 1980 the 'pesticide problem' 
was a matter of intense debate in the Malaysian public sphere. 
One approach to the contestation and regulation of pesticide use 
in Malaysia 'could be to see the rise of new values and norms, 
including an increasing awareness of health and environmental 
problems, as a result of the increasing modernization and 
development of Malaysian society. Measures to control the problems 
caused by pesticides and promote alternative forms of pest control 
as propagated by the NGOs and certain agricultural scientists, the 
story would go, have been stalled by vested economic interests of 
the pesticide industry and estate owners. In the semi-democratic 
polity of Malaysia, the government, preoccupied with economic 
growth and development, has responded only slowly by 
formulating and implementing various more or less effective policies 
to control health and environmental problems caused by pesticides. 
It is not that this approach is incorrect or an unfruitful mode of 
analysis. For instance, the approach could probably serve as an 
excellent entry to a policy process analysis which could establish the 
differentiation of interests and strategies found within and between 
economic interest groups, NGOs and policy-makers in the state 
apparatus. Yet, it leaves little space, I think, for illuminating the 
construction of categories, assumptions, truths and knowledges 
which today are taken for granted; constructions which have crucial 
implications for the way that the use of pesticides in Malaysia was 
problematized and governmentalized. More precisely, this approach 
renders it absolutely impossible to analyse how the making of public 
health as a domain of interventions through scientific discourses 
came to have crucial implications for the way that one could 
possibly govern and contest the use of pesticides. More importantly, 
it does not provide a means of analysis for the way that 
governmental rationalities1 came to be translated into a series of 
disciplinary techniques aiming to influence the behaviour of farmers 
and plantation workers in relation to their application of pesticides. 
Analytical Perspective and Arguments 
This article tries to analyse the importance of scientific discourses 
and governmental rationalities in the struggle over the pesticide use 
in Malaysia by drawing on Michel Foucault's genealogical approach 
in the study of historical formations and transformations of 
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power/knowledge relations (Foucault 1979; 1980; 1990; 1991b). It is, 
of course, impossible to produce any account of Foucault's 
genealogical approach in this article. Hence, the following only 
outlines, in the briefest fashion, some key notions giving rise to three 
main arguments presented in the article. 
The first argument revolves around the importance of scientific 
discourses in regulating and restricting the struggle over pesticides, 
and takes as its point of departure Foucault's notion of a 'regime of 
truth'. Foucault introduced the notion of 'regime of truth' to point to the 
interrelatedness between power and truth: that they directly imply one 
another, and that their very existence is preconditioned by each other. 
Thus, the important thing to note, argues Foucault, is that: 
Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that 
is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; 
the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true 
and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the 
techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; 
the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true 
(Foucault 1980: 131). 
One of the main characteristics of the regime of truth found in 
modern societies, argued Foucault, is that it is 'centred on the form of 
scientific discourse and the institutions that produce it' (Foucault 
1980: 131). In other words, scientific discourses, the people who 
articulate them, and the institutions reproducing them, are granted a 
unique authority in modern societies. 
In contesting the use of pesticides in Malaysia on the basis of the 
poisonous effects this had on human beings - and this is the first 
argument of this article - one resorted to scientific discourses to be 
taken seriously. More precisely, only by resorting to medical and 
toxicological discourses was it possible to tell the truth about 
pesticide poisoning, and more importantly to speak with authority. 
The effect of this politics of expert knowledge, that is, the attempts to 
validate and invalidate claims of the effects of pesticides by resorting to 
scientific discourses, was to technicalize and restrict the possible 
modalities by which the use of pesticides could be contested. 
The second and third arguments revolve around Foucault's notion 
of 'governmentality' and 'bio-power'. Governmental rationalities, 
that is, the questions of 'How to govern oneself, how to be governed, 
how to govern others, by whom the people will accept being 
governed, how to become the best possible governor' became crucial 
issues in Western societies from the 16th and 17th centuries. As 
pointed out by Foucault these problems marked a radical rupture 
from the line of advice found in Machiavelli's The Prince. What is at 
stake is less how to reinforce, strengthen and protect the prince's 
relation to his territory than how to govern most effectively the men 
and things in their relations with one another within a territory 
(Foucault 1991b: 87). Government came to designate a relation 
internal to the state, namely the art of conducting the conduct of 
men. Governmental rationalities, or just governmentalities, as they 
have emerged in Western societies for the last four centuries, then, 
could be conceived as the relatively systematic, explicit, discursive 
problematization and codification of the art or practice of 
government, as a way of rendering objects in a language that makes 
them governable (Dean 1994: 187). 
Bio-power is a key aspect of modern governmentalities. In The 
Order of Things, Foucault (1970) demonstrated that life, conceived as 
an organic functional being, is not an eternal object but only entered 
Western European thought at the end of the 18th century. In The 
History of Sexuality, Foucault would subsequently argue that life at 
this time became not only an object of knowledge, but also of power 
and administration. Bio-power emerged as an ensemble of new 
forms of knowledge and techniques of government, the aim of 
which was to administrate life at the level of the human species, the 
race, and the phenomena of population (Foucault 1990: 137). 
Bio-power designates the techniques through which life and its 
mechanisms are brought into the realm of explicit'calculations, and 
relations of power/knowledge are made an agent of transformation 
of human life (Foucault 1990: 143). The power over life, according to 
Foucault, evolved around two basic forms of techniques linked 
together by a complex set of relations: the disciplines of the body 
and the regulations of the population. The first set of techniques, the 
'anatomo-politics' of the human body, aimed to discipline the 
individual human body. Procedures were established which centred 
'on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its 
capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its 
usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient 
and economic controls' (Foucault 1990: 139). 
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The second set of techniques, the bio-politics of the population, 
focused on the species body, and dealt with the mechanisms of life 
and biological processes: 'propagation, births and mortality, the level 
of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that 
can cause these to vary' (Foucault 1990: 139). These regulatory controls 
were associated with new types of knowledge, such as demography 
and statistics, through which it is gradually 'discovered': first, that 
population has it own regularities, its own rate of mortality and 
diseases, its cycles of scarcity, etc.; second, that population involves a 
range of intrinsic, aggregate effects, phenomena that are irreducible to 
those of the family, such as epidemics, endemic levels of mortality, 
ascending spirals of labour and wealth; and lastly, that population has 
specific economic effects (Foucault 1991b: 99; see also Hacking 1982). 
The second argument, then, is that the promotion of the safe use of 
pesticides in Malaysia on the grounds that it presents a threat to the 
health of the population only became possible once the standard of the 
health of the population, or segments thereof, was taken up by bio- 
power as a domain for the deployment of regulatory interventions. It is 
illustrated that although a comprehensive medical apparatus had been 
elaborated by the British colonial administration from the end of the 
19th century, it was only after the recasting of development discourse 
between 1945-55 that the population's standard of health became an 
object for public policies. This transformation of public health policies 
was a precondition for the subsequent call for the regulation of the use 
of pesticides on the ground that it presented a threat to the population's 
standard of health. 
Third and finally, contestation over the use of pesticides, on the 
grounds that it presented a threat to public health, tended to be reduced 
to a conflict over the effectiveness and implementation of regulatory 
techniques. That is, what has been questioned is not the need for 
government policies to promote the safe use of pesticides, but the 
effectiveness, adequacy and the level of implementation of these 
initiatives. This is not to say that alternatives to techniques of 
government aiming to promote the safe use of pesticides have not been 
sought. For instance, the NGOs have during the early 1990s engaged 
themselves in what is still limited, but none the less important 
alternative forms of agricultural production without using chemical 
pesticides. Rather the point is that governmental rationalities have 
served constantly to update the techniques aiming to promote public 
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health: every time government intervention is seen to fail, 
governmentalities hold the promise to monitor, control and regulate 
the use of pesticides through either more strict enforcement of 
existing techniques, or the introduction of new and allegedly more 
effective ones. 
The Transformation of Public Health Policies through, 
Development Discourse 
Public health policies underwent an important transformation in 
relation to the recasting of development discourse between 1945-55 in 
that the promotion of the population's standard of health was taken 
up as an issue for government. This was absolutely crucial for the way 
that the use of pesticides was subsequently to be problematized. 
The promotion of the economic progress of the Malay states was a 
crucial rationale for the efforts invested to prevent and cure diseases 
among the 'natives' from around 1870s, when, in relation to the 
efforts of the British colonial administration to promote order and 
progress, the question of government became an issue of 
unprecedented importance in the Malay states (cf. Annual Report of 
the Federated Malay States, 1895-1935). The 'opening-up' of the 
Federated Malay States from the 1870s, with new mining and 
planting areas, new roads and railways, and new townships, was 
accompanied by a dramatic rise in diseases such as malaria, beriberi, 
dysentery, smallpox and cholera (Kennedy 1962; Gullick 1969). The 
horrendous extent of disease was seen to present a real threat to the 
task of developing the Malay states, and a number of important 
measures were taken from the 1880s to the 1940s, to prevent and 
cure diseases both among Europeans and non-Europeans. The 
effects of these measures were quite impressive. The incidence of 
smallpox, beriberi and malaria was significantly reduced in the first 
quarter of this century by introducing preventive vaccinations, 
complementary diets, and drainage respectively. For instance, 
between 1910 and 1920 the death rate among estate labourers due to 
malaria was reduced by two-thirds, and between 1910 and 1925 the 
overall death rate in Peninsular Malaya dropped from 32.2 to 23.6 
per 1,000 (Report on the Federated Malay States, 1910-25). By the second 
quarter of this century Malaya was seen as having the best medical 
and health services in Asia (Balfour and Scott 1924: 150-55). 
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Notwithstanding the effectiveness of the measures deployed to cure 
and prevent diseases, they were not intended to improve the general 
welfare of the people of the Malay states, but rather to ensure that 
diseases did not hinder economic progress. The rationale for the 
health policies conducted in the Malay states fitted into the general 
British health policy for its colonies. Thus, in the British Colonial 
Development Act 1929 the 'promotion of public health', though an 
important part of colonial policy, was seen as only one among many 
other means to contribute to the 'advances for aiding and developing 
agriculture and industry in certain colonies and territories' (Colonial 
Development Act 1929). The British policy on the health of its colonial 
subjects significantly changed in the 1940s, with crucial ramifications 
in Malaya. The British Development and Welfare Act 1940 set forth for 
the first time at the level of colonial public policies, the promotion of 
the welfare and development of the colonial populations. Public 
health was to be an important element in the attempts to promote 
the welfare of the native populations. Thus, the connection between 
development of productive resources on the one hand, and the 
progress of the living standards of the colonial subjects on the other, 
was spelled out in the Colonial Office's The Planning of Social and 
Economic Development in the Colonial Empire like this: 'Health, wealth 
and wisdom each help in the attainment of the others; and forward 
steps in the spheres of production, public health and education are 
not merely mutually compatible, they are mutually essential' 
(Colonial Office 1944: 3). This shift in the strategic objectives of 
British colonial policy was to be crucial for Malaya. 
Public health policies in Malaya underwent a radical 
transformation in the period 1945-55 when, through the recasting of 
development discourse, the promotion of the welfare standard of the 
population became a task for government. It is beyond the scope of 
this article to document how this transformation took place, only 
brief indications can be given by pointing to two important 
documents. In 1949, the year after the British colonial power had 
committed itself to prepare for the independence of Malaya, the 
British High Commissioner initiated the work on the first 
comprehensive plan of the economic and social development of 
Malaya. With the Draft Development Plan of the Federation of Malaya 
issued in 1950, Malaya became, for the first time, equipped with a 
plan that attempted to 'define the objectives of social and economic 
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policy for the period 1950-55: to balance them in relation to each 
other, and to plan them within range of the resources available to 
finance them' (Draft Development Plan of the Federation of Malaya 1950: 
i). In meeting 'the demands of the people for social services and 
social justice' and improving 'the conditions under which people 
live', which was seen as the central task for government, public 
health programmes were to play an important role (ibid.: i). Thus the 
Draft Development Plan of the Federation of Malaya allocated substantial 
resources to the establishment of a training school for local medical 
personnel, rural health services, treatment of tuberculosis, 
improvement of general hospitals, and medical research (ibid. : 10-1 1). 
The report The Economic Development of Malaya, produced by a 
Mission from the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development in 1955, was the hitherto most comprehensive analysis 
made on the 'need' for social and economic development, and the 
potentials and obstacles to accomplish this. It served effectively to carve 
out the developmental imagery that persists largely unmodified in 
contemporary Malaysia, namely that of a 'society' in need of 
'development'. On public health and medical care, the report found that 
the colonial administration had made 'outstanding achievements' in 
improving public health and medicine but much remained to be done. 
There were several reasons for the need for further improvement. One 
reason was that 'environmental controls' were no longer seen as 
sufficient to improve public health; it would increasingly be necessary to 
apply 'personal services' which were much more expensive. Another 
reason was that as the population kept growing, an increasing number 
of people were to be served. Finally, the fact that 'all racial groups in the 
population now increasingly accept and expect "western medicine", and 
have begun to demand clinic and hospital services' was taken as a 
further proof of the need for expansion of public health programmes 
and expenditures (The Economic Development of Malaya 1955: 547). 
What was new about the Draft Development Plan of the Federation of 
Malaya and The Economic Development of Malaya was not the deployment 
of government programmes aiming to prevent and cure illnesses in the 
Malayan population. As illustrated, comprehensive measures had taken 
place on this issue from the late 19th century. The new thing was that 
these measures intended no longer primarily to enable and sustain the 
development of economic resources, but to improve the general welfare 
standard of the body species. 
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The transformation of bio-power meant that the population's standard 
of health became a target of knowledge and regulatory intervention. 
Population statistics had been introduced as early as the 1880s, when 
the population's size, movement, racial and spatial distribution came 
to be known. From the 1940s there suddenly emerged a need for more 
systematic and comprehensive knowledge of the population's 
standard of health. Thus, it becomes urgent to produce comprehensive 
and reliable statistical data on the causes of sickness and death, infant 
mortality, and average life expectancy (The Economic Development of 
Malaya 1955: 548-50). The population's health standard, measured by 
the new statistical knowledge, was now to be promoted through 
expansion and improvement of government services: training and 
expansion of staff; modernization and extension of the hospital 
system; expansion of ambulatory care facilities; the development of a 
network of rural health centres; initiation of research and educational 
campaigns on nutrition, etc. (The Economic Development of Malaya 1955: 
148-53). These and other public health programmes were further 
expanded in the decade following Independence in 1959, and 
substantial parts of government expenditure were invested to bring 
about their implementation (cf. First Malaysia Plan 1966-1970). 
The Governmentalization of the Use of Pesticides 
The problematization of the use of pesticides from the perspective of 
public health has largely taken two lines: concern over 'occupational' 
health problems, that is, poisoning of farmers and plantation 
workers during application of pesticides; and concern over 
'consumer health', that is, poisoning of consumers caused by 
pesticide residue in food items. 
The threat to the health of farmers and plantation workers posed 
by poisoning with pesticides was first politicized in the late 1970s in 
various newspaper articles, NGO journals and at conferences held 
by the NGOs and the agricultural scientific community (Gill 1978; 
Ong et al. 1978). The first comprehensive critique of the use of 
pesticides was launched by Sahabat Alam Malaysia, SAM (Friends 
of the Earth Malaysia) in 1981. In the booklet Pesticide Problems in a 
Developing Country - A Case Study of Malaysia, SAM pointed out the 
negative effects caused by pesticides on human health and the 
environment, and claimed that Malaysia had become a 'dumping 
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ground' for pesticides banned in industrialized countries. More 
importantly, the Pesticides Act adopted in 1974 was criticized for 
being inadequate and not fully enforced, and the Pesticides Board 
was urged together with the Health Ministry to 'play their roles in 
educating the farmers as well as the general public on the safe and 
proper use of pesticides' (Sahabat Alam Malaysia 1981). 
The struggle over pesticide poisoning of farmers and plantation 
labour in the 1980s focused on the incapability of the government to 
monitor and control the use of pesticides. For instance, SAM, in an 
infamous article pointing to the numerous incidents of pesticide 
poisoning among plantation workers, argued that the government's 
Pesticides Board had not lived up to what could be expected, hence, 
it 'should be scrapped and replaced with a fully-fledged department 
with effective powers to regulate and control the pesticide industry 
in Malaysia' (Sunday Star, 19.2.1984; Malay Mail (MM) 21.3.1984).* 
Attention to pesticide residues in food was first raised in the late 
1970s by various natural scientists (e.g. Gill 1978: 179; MM 20.2.1978), 
but concern only gathered momentum in 1987 when the Singapore 
Ministry of Environment found fungicide residues (ethylene 
bisdithiocarbamate, EBDC) in spring onions imported from the 
Malaysian Cameron Highlands to be between 20 and 50 times above 
the level permitted in Singapore (New Straits Times (NST) 2.3.1987). 
Singapore authorities subsequently decided to deploy a provisional 
ban on the import of spring onions and certain other vegetables from 
Malaysia (Star, 4.4.1987). When subsequent testings conducted by 
the Malaysian authorities showed that many leafy vegetables from 
the Cameron Highlands (which is the main centre for commercial 
vegetable production in Malaysia) also contained pesticide residues 
in concentrations exceeding WHO standards, the Malaysian 
government made a public announcement in which it advised 
consumers to avoid eating seven types of vegetables from the 
Cameron Highlands (NST 4 and 5.3.1987). 
In the quite strident public debate that followed in the weeks after 
Singapore's import ban and the revelation of 'excessive' levels of 
pesticide residues in vegetables from the Cameron Xighlands, the 
demand for government action was raised from several locations. 
State Assemblyman for the city of Tanah Rata (in the Cameron 
Highlands) said that it was 'unfair' to blame the farmers for the 
excessive use of fungicides. Rather 'The Agriculture Ministry should 
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have played a more active role in monitoring and supervising the 
application of fungicides'. He added that 'Most of these farmers are 
uneducated and need more expert advice and supervision' (Star, 
6.3.1987). Many NGOs called for governmental intervention along 
similar lines by urging the government to take responsibility for 
poisoning incidents and to carry out regular tests of pesticide 
residues in fruit and vegetables both in the fields and at the markets. 
There can be no doubt that the protest over the use of pesticides 
from the early 1980s was influential in the implementation of 
measures to counteract these problems. Yet it should be noted that 
the issue had been taken up as a task for government a decade 
before, when a quite comprehensive legislation and a government 
body were established to control the hazards to human health and 
the environment caused by pesticides. 
The document The Need for Pesticide Legislation in Malaysia, issued 
in 1974 by the Plant Protection Services of the Division of 
Agriculture, explains why it was 'necessary' to take up the use of 
pesticides in relation to public health as a matter of public policy: 
During the past quarter of a century nations in all parts of the world 
had benefited from increasing use of synthetic organic chemicals for 
the control of pests, diseases, weeds, etc. These chemicals are 
biological poisons and therefore, recognized precautionary measures 
must be taken to protect human health and prevent serious ill effects 
in the various stages of manufacture, storage, transportation and use 
(Balasubramaniam 1974: 1). 
The objective of the Pesticides Act adopted in 1974 was briefly stated 
to be: 'An Act to control pesticides'. A more expanded formulation 
given later stated that the Act's objective is five-fold: 
(1) to control manufacture, sale and storage of pesticides in the country; 
(2) to ensure that pesticides are effective as claimed on the label; 
(3) to control adulteration with respect to its contents, concentration of 
active ingredients, efficacy and other characteristic of the pesticides; 
(4) to control pesticide residues in food for local use and also for 
export; and 
(5) to control pesticide hazards to users, operators, the public, 
domestic animals, water sources and the environment 
(Department of Agriculture 1989). 
The Pesticides Act 1974 came to be based partly on elements contained 
in the Voluntary Registration Scheme initiated in 1971, and partly on 
Peter Triantafillou 
an unpublished FA0 report produced in 1972 by the Government of 
Malaysia which outlined detailed suggestions on technical and 
organizational measures for a licensing scheme (cf. Boardman 1986: 
160). The Pesticides Act required a number of technical data for 
registration of the individual pesticide product including: 
composition of the product; 
a chemical designation of active ingredients; 
efficacy on pest/diseases of crops; 
dosage and number of applications recommended; 
dire&ons for use; 
0 amount and nature of residue left on crops at various intervals 
after application; 
analytical procedure; and 
toxicity of the product 
(Pesticides Act 1974; Pesticides (Registration) Rules 1976). 
A new government agency, the Pesticides Board, was set up in 1994 
within the Plant Protection Unit in the Ministry of Agriculture to 
implement the Act. In practice the Pesticides Board serves to ensure 
that all relevant technical government bodies participate in decision- 
making of principal importance, such as the making of new 
regulations. If the Pesticides Board primarily has a representational 
function, the Pesticides Section (likewise placed in the Plant Protection 
Unit) is in charge of conducting the everyday work of pesticide 
registration, formulation control, bioefficacy, toxicological testing and 
licensing control (Malaysian-German Pesticide Project 1993: 26-32). 
In summary, considering that the use of pesticides was not an 
issue of intense dispute before 1980, it may seem rather curious that 
the Malaysian government by the early 1970s had invested 
substantial efforts in putting together a comprehensive legislation 
and establishing a technical body to control pesticides. That is, apart 
from a few agricultural scientists who had raised the issue of the 
build-up of resistance to certain insecticides (Conway and Wood 
1964; Wood 1968; 1971), public attention to the problems that 
pesticides might cause to public health and the environment was at a 
very low level. One should not, of course, ignore the fact that the 
dangers of pesticides had been increasingly politicized in the 
industrialized countries during the 1960s. Nor should it be ignored 
that the issue had been taken up by the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) in 
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the late 1960s and that they in collaboration produced a set of 
guidelines for the regulation of pesticides in developing countries 
(cf. Boardman 1986). While there can be no doubt that these events 
influenced the timing of the Malaysian government's decision to 
create legislation and an institution to control pesticides, it should be 
stresse'cl that these measures aiming to protect standards of public 
health only made sense due to the way development discourse had 
been recast between 1945-55. i.e. when the protection and 
improvement of public health standards became a key objective for 
regulating the population. 
The making of a pesticide policy in Malaysia in the early 1970s, 
then, had very little if anything to do with public awareness of, or 
objections over, the use of pesticides. Rather this should be seen in 
relation to the conjuncture of, on the one hand, the transformation of 
bio-politics that made the improvement of the population's health a 
key objective, and on the other hand, the circulation of medical and 
toxicological discourses from the 1960s, through for instance F A 0  
and WHO reports, which made visible the toxicological threats to 
human health posed by pesticides. 
Telling the Truth about Pesticide Poisoning 
Toxicological and medical discourses assumed a crucial role in the 
debates over the use of pesticides. A brief illustration of the 
categories, truths and assumptions found in the Guidelines on 
Toxicological Data Requirement for Pesticide Registration issued by the 
Pesticides Board may be useful. The introduction reads: 
Toxicological data are submitted for pesticide registration aimed at 
defining possible hazards to man, non-target organisms and the 
environment . . . Many practical recommendations can be derived 
from appropriate and thorough toxicological data such as hazard 
classification, restrictions on use, appropriate precautionary 
measures necessary to allow safe use, suggestion of appropriate 
diagnosis and management of a poisoned person, establishment of 
Acceptable Daily Intake (ADI) e t ~ . ~  
In these few lines the intersection between toxicological discourse 
and governmental rationalities is pointed out with remarkable 
precision: from appropriate and thorough toxicological data can be 
derived a number of 'appropriate measures' to allow the 'safe use' of 
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pesticides. The notion of 'hazard classification' is crucial because it 
actively displaces the irregularity of individual poisonings, which in 
some cases lead to slight indispositions and in other cases to death, 
by an average measure of danger based on clinical experiments in 
which test animals are exposed to controlled levels of pesticides. As 
a measure of danger, 'hazard classification' shifts the attention from 
individual and random poisoning accidents caused by a particular 
set of agricultural practices, to an expected severity of poisoning 
caused by exposure to a particular pesticide. In fact, from the 
perspective of hazard, poisoning is not accidental at all, but the 
measurable, regular and normal effect of exposure to pesticides. 
Whereas the problem of random individual poisoning incidents 
does not allow prediction of accidents and hence point either to the 
outright acceptance of the use of pesticides wait accompli) or its total 
elimination, the problem of hazard makes possible general measures 
of restriction and prevention so as to allow the continued but 'safe' use 
of pesticides. Medical and toxicological knowledge enables the 
establishment of correct and 'appropriate diagnosis', and the 
subsequent 'management' of poisoning incidents. Pesticide poisoning 
is not a random or accidental phenomenon caused by a certain 
modern modality of pest control, but rather a predictable and normal 
'side-effect' of pesticides which can be controlled by the deployment of 
appropriate techniques of medical diagnosis and management. 
Likewise, by establishing a general set of calculated levels of 
pesticide intake, below which the human body will not display 
poisoning symptoms, the category of Acceptable Daily Intake makes 
it possible to continue the use of pesticides in a controlled and 'safe' 
manner. Thus, for each food item consumed in Malaysia, the Food 
Regulations 2985 define a Maximum Residue Level, i.e. the upper 
limit of allowed pesticide residue concentration in each food item. 
The establishment of the Maximum Residue Levels is by no means 
arbitrary, but follows WHO standards which, in turn, are based on 
controlled medical and toxicological studies to determine the level 
below which the toxic effects of pesticides in specific food items are 
'insignificant' 
Attention to the harmful effects of pesticides reached hitherto 
unprecedented heights in 1985, when an international campaign on 
the harmful effects of twelve of the most abundantly used and 
hazardous pesticides, 'The Dirty Dozen' campaign, was launched by 
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the Pesticides Action Network (PAN).4 The Dirty Dozen campaign's 
dissemination of scientific knowledge on the negative effects of 
pesticides and its disclosure that several of the Dirty Dozen 
pesticides used in developing countries were either severely 
restricted or banned in industrialized countries, drew substantial 
attention to the negative effects of pesticides in both industrialized 
and developing countries. 
The Dirty Dozen campaign coincided with a number of efforts to 
document the 'real' extent of human pesticide poisonkg in Malaysia. 
The Pesticides Board in 1985 to be informed of all pesticide 
poisoning cases reported to the government hospitals and clinics. A 
computerized database of poisoning cases was established in 1987 
by the Toxicology Unit of the Pesticide Section to serve as a basis for 
decisions on the registration, deregistration or re-registration of 
pesticides (Malaysian-German Pesticide Project 1993: 90). The 
Occupational Health Unit of the Division of Health of the Ministry 
of Health began from 1986 to collect and publish information on 
incidents of pesticide poisoning and pesticide residues in food (cf. 
Ministry of Health Annual Report). 
The statistics on pesticide residues published by the Ministry of 
Health produced rather predictable, but none the less interesting 
differences of opinion. On the one hand, the NGOs in general found 
the figures worrying. For instance, the President of the 
Environmental Protection Society Malaysia, Gurmit Singh, found the 
1992 survey results disturbing because they showed that 9.2% of the 
test samples exceeded the Maximum Residue Levels (NST, 
15.3.1994). On the other hand, most officials from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Ministry of Health, and researchers from the 
Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development Institute and the 
Agricultural University (Universiti Pertanian Malaysia) all agreed 
that the incidence of pesticide residues in Malaysian food was not 
alarming. For instance, when the figures for 1992 were presented, 
Assistant Director of the Food Quality Control Unit, Ministry of 
Health, Dr. Anuar Ariffin said: 'consumer perceptions of risk do not 
usually coincide with the actual hazard involved for many food 
safety issues as seen from the scientific angle or that envisaged by 
food control organizations' (NST, 15.3.1994, my emphasis). In a 
comment on the figures for 1993, Dr. Anuar Ariffin commented: 
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Exact permissible levels are set as means of control, but exceeding this 
by a fraction need not constitute an instant health hazard. The panic 
begins because consumers reject the safety margin and say they do 
not want any chemicals used in food production. There is a need to 
see the risk from a practical perspective and strike a balance in 
managing it (NST, 2.5.1994). 
If worries over the level of pesticide residues in food were to be 
taken as valid and authoritative, they should not simply refer to the 
deceiving 'perceptions', but to the 'scientific angle', i.e. toxicological 
discourses, which allowed you to speak of the 'actual hazard' 
involved. The occurrence of pesticide residues in food was not to be 
judged on individual and random perceptions, but according to a 
calculated level of risk. By rendering possible the establishment of a 
'safety margin' (i.e., the level below which exposure to pesticides did 
not constitute a risk to human health), toxicological discourses 
simultaneously enabled the continued use of pesticides in a 
controlled and 'safe' manner. 
Three other examples may illustrate how claims uttered on the 
effects of pesticides tried to validate and authorize themselves by 
resorting to toxicological and medical discourses, and how this in 
turn affected the struggle. First, in a newspaper article under the 
headline 'Truth about Paraquat', the legal advisor of the Consumers' 
Association of Penang (CAP) responded to an advertisement by ICI 
Agrochemicals on paraquat with the rather provoking text: 'Paraquat 
and Nature working in perfect Harmony' (NST, 6.7.1993). CAP'S 
legal advisor argued that 'the claims made in the advertisements [of 
paraquat not being harmful to aquatic life and wildlife] have not 
been substantiated by independent research bodies' (ibid.). To 
counter the unsubstantiated claims made in the advertisement, CAP 
referred to tests made by foreign scientists, such as the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, which had shown that paraquat, 
though absorbed by clay particles in the soil, could still contaminate 
groundwater. Raman added that a toxicologist of the US 
Environmental Defense Fund had found that paraquat could bring 
'potential environmental contamination and damage to health' (NST, 
6.7.1993). In the same newspaper article, a spokesperson for ICI 
Agrochemicals, when asked about the purpose of the advertisement, 
said that it was a campaign to clear the 'myths' about paraquat and 
defend the product for what it 'really' is: 'Our claims are substantiated 
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by research done by ICIA and certain independent research groups' 
(NST, 6.7.1993). Now, while it is correct that ICI has undertaken and 
published several studies of paraquat use in Malaysian agriculture 
which, stated in admittedly very brief terms, show that the 
occupational health problems are negligible and can be avoided by 
few and simple measures of precaution (Chester and Woolen 1981; 
Howard et al. 1981; Whitaker 1989) the bulk of 'independent' research 
shows that even low-level exposure to paraquat may cause skin 
rashes, blistering, damage to the nails, and eye irritation (Ng and 
Thong 1978; Chan and Cheong 1982), and that the equipment 
necessary for adequate human protection against poisoning is very 
difficult to wear and apply in tropical climates (e.g. Conway 1991: 
110). The point, however, is not whether it is ICI Agrochernicals or 
CAP who has got the 'facts' right, but that it is deemed necessary to 
resort to scientific discourses to 'substantiate' or validate any argument 
on the presumed danger of pesticides. In order to speak with 
authority, propositions could not be based on 'emotional' thought, nor 
merely on the 'perceived' dangers caused by pesticides. Rather one 
had to appeal to medical discourses in general and toxicological 
discourses in particular to tell the 'truth' about pesticide poisoning. 
The second example may illustrate how pesticide poisoning was 
conceived as an object represented by a perceiving subject. To make 
the true representation of the object, the subject could not rely 
arbitrarily on his or her perceptions but had to resort to scientific 
discourses. In an editorial of the pesticide industry's newsletter it 
was argued that: 
The Pesticide Industry in Malaysia (and in the world) is very much 
misunderstood. The benefits of the (correct) usage of pesticides are 
often masked by the fears (real or perceived) of the harm pesticides 
can do to the environment, animals and, most importantly, to 
humans. Often these fears are unfounded and the subsequent 'panic' 
a result of emotional rather than logical thought (MACA Newsletter, 1 
(1) 1988; cited from reprint in MACA Newsletter, 6 (1) 1994). 
The 'real' danger of pesticides was to be located as a property of the 
pesticide as such, that is, pesticides conceived as an object in itself. In 
contrast, the 'perceived' danger was seen as the 'distorted' 
representation produced by the perceiving subject who, when driven 
by emotions, was no doubt prone to make erroneous observations on 
the true character of the pesticide-object. Now, it does not take much 
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to see that what is at play here is the tension invoked by the modern 
Western invention of the division between 'the-thing-in-itself' and 
'the-thing-for-us'; the tension between the truth of the mute object 
and the deceiving senses of the truth-searching subject5 While at 
first this may seem to be of remote interest to the concrete struggle 
over pesticides in Malaysia, it must be recognized that the authority 
of any statement made in relation to the use of pesticides came to 
hinge on the ability to utter the 'true' representation of the thing-in- 
itself, that is, pesticide poisoning as an object in itself. And it is 
exactly at this point that scientific discourses enter into the politics of 
truth, because the only way one could produce the 'true' 
representation of the object of pesticide poisoning was by resorting 
to scientific discourses, notably medical and toxicological discourses. 
The third and final example illustrates how the politics of exper- 
tise turned out to have unintended consequences for the critics of 
pesticides. In 1984 SAM had launched a harsh critique of the Pesti- 
cides Board which was accused not only of being a 'sleeping 
watchdog', but also lacking 'expertise' to undertake studies on the 
effects of the widespread use of pesticides in Malaysian 
agriculture. As an example of the Board's insufficient expert 
knowledge and research capacity, SAM pointed to the Board's 
approval of the use of the pesticide 2,4,5-T despite the fact that 
research findings of the US Environmental Protection Agency had 
shown that it contained dioxin which was found to be linked to 
spontaneous abortions (Star, 19.2.1984). The critique was not 
without effect. The Chairman of the Pesticides Board (and Deputy 
Agriculture Minister) Abu Bakar, after insisting on the value of the 
Board's research and regulatory initiatives, to a certain extent 
accommodated the critique by stating that: 'They [SAM and CAP] 
should understand our problems. There are thousands of pesticides 
on the market and it is difficult to monitor them all' (Star, 26.2.1984). 
The engagement in the politics of expertise was however to back- 
fire on SAM only the following year. In a newspaper article SAM 
claimed that Monsanto had decided to withdraw the herbicide Scout 
from the market because it could cause 'parthenocraphy [sic.], a dis- 
ease affecting the lungs and causing other health problems' (Sunday 
Star, 26.5.1985). A Monsanto spokesperson immediately rejected 
SAM'S allegations and explained that the term 'parthenocarpic' is a 
botanical term designating the development of fruits without the 
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fertilization of the ovules. The spokesperson added that he 'hoped 
SAM would get its facts right before making any allegations' (Star, 
28.5.1985). Also Pesticides Board Chairman, Abu Bakar, rejected 
SAM's allegations, and posed an explanation of the term 'partheno- 
carpy' similar to that given by the Monsanto spokesperson. He con- 
cluded: 'the claim that SAM made was not true' (Star, 2.6.1985). 
SAM, in turn, had to admit that it was 'wrong', and SAM's President 
added that: 'We are very glad Monsanto has now clarified the issue 
in the interest of all concerned' (Star, 29.5.1985). 
In summary, two rather contradictory effects were produced by 
the NGOs' resort to scientific discourses to validate their propo- 
sitions. On the one hand, by basing their criticism of pesticides on 
'facts', the government and the industry could no longer disqualify 
this type of criticism as being only 'emotional'. The criticism had to 
be taken seriously and, as will be illustrated in the following, both 
the government and the industry from the mid-1980s expanded the 
measures aiming to regulate the problem. On the other hand, by re- 
sorting to medical and toxicological discourses to utter the truth 
about pesticides in relation to human health, the NGOs contributed 
to the reinforcement of these regimes of truth. By entering effectively 
into the politics of expertise in which one had to adhere to the 'facts' 
and 'logic' produced through scientific discourses, the possible 
modes of criticism were at the same time being severely restricted. 
The politics of pesticide use, in this way, was reinforced as a matter to 
be dealt with by experts. If the NGOs increasingly resorted to scientific 
discourses, this was hardly because they were unconscious about the 
consequences this could entail, but rather because this was the only 
way to tell the truth about pesticides, and more importantly, because 
this was the most effective way of validating claims over the 
poisonous effects of pesticides. Conversely, the resorting to scientific 
discourses by the Ministry of Agriculture and the pesticide industry 
should not be seen as an excuse to dismiss criticism. Rather, they were 
resorting to the modality in which one could speak in the most 
authoritative manner about the health effects caused by pesticides. 
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Disciplining Farmers in Their Use of Pesticides 
'No pesticide is entirely without risk, but there are many ways of 
using them safely and efficiently.' (Mamat 1989) 
The Ministry of Agriculture in 1978 submitted a request for technical 
assistance to the West German aid organization GTZ in order to im- 
plement the Pesticides Act and 'to train local chemists on residue 
analysis and also to obtain foreign expertise and equipment in the 
establishment and operation of a new pesticide residue laboratory' 
(Malaysian-German Pesticide Project 1993: 3). After years of nego- 
tiations the Malaysian-German Pesticide Project (MGPP) was initiated 
in 1984, the overall goal of which was to ensure that 'damage to man 
and the environment caused by pesticides is minimized' (Malaysian- 
German Pesticide Project 1993: 8). 
The problem of minimizing the 'damage to man and the environ- 
ment caused by pesticides' was broken up into manageable units. By 
following the 'Problem Tree' analysis, a highly controversial issue 
was translated into a series of technical problems to which there cor- 
responded a set of 'adequate' solutions. First of all the damage to 
man and environment was seen as caused by the 'fact' that pesticides 
are not used 'judiciously' (Malaysian-German Pesticide Project 1993: 8). 
The assumption here, of course, is that for the problem to be solved 
one need not avoid the use of pesticides: that there exists a modality 
of pesticide use that will not damage man and the environment. By 
this technical operation all arguments for banning the use of 
pesticides were transcended. 
Non-judicious use of pesticides was seen to have three causes: users' 
lack of knowledge regarding pesticides; farmers' neglect of consumer 
safety (despite knowledge); and the inadequate enforcement of pesticide 
legislation. Three broad solutions were proposed: education, monitoring 
of pesticide residues, and better enforcement respectively. The three 
generd solutions suggested by the MGPP reflect the discussions and 
problernatizations found in the Malaysian public sphere from the early 
1980s on how best to deviate pesticide problems. 
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Education and Training 
Education of the farmers and plantation workers in relation to the 
use of pesticides came to be a pressing issue. Certain NGOs, such as 
the Environmental Protection Society of Malaysia, had urged the 
Ministry of Agriculture to start (a nation-wide campaign to educate 
farmers on the use of pesticides as early as the late 1970s (e.g. Sunday 
Mail, 18.11. 1979). However, it was not until the early 1980s, when 
the protests over pesticide poisoning proliferated, that the 'need' to 
educate the farmers became widely accepted. Thus, the leading na- 
tional newspapers started to ask what had happened to the sup- 
posed commitment to educate the workers who handle the cherni- 
cals on the necessary safety measures (e.g. NST, 14.9.1983). 
The need for education was supported by the Ministry of Agri- 
culture. In August 1984 the Ministry promised to launch a major 
campaign to educate the public on the 'proper' handling and use of 
pesticides through talks, exhibitions and training sessions (MM, 
17.6.1985), and the following year the Director General of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Datuk Abu Bakar, argued that legislation 
alone would not prevent misuse of agricultural poisons, that what 
was more important was to educate its users on the 'proper' methods 
of usage (NST, 17.7.1985). 
The following analysis of educational activities conducted by the 
Ministry of Agriculture deals only with the pesticide extension pro- 
gramme launched in 1988/89 under the MGPP.6 The ambitious goal 
of the programme was to train all Malaysian pesticide users (the 
number of which in the Report is estimated to be 500,000) in 'the 
proper handling of the products and train them in safety measures' 
(Malaysian-German Pesticide Project 1993: 102). 
Participatory training was seen as the most promising technique 
for achieving the objective of the 'judicious' use of pesticides. Due to 
the changing objectives it was considered that the Training and Visit 
(T&V) system, which had been applied successfully during the 
Green Revolution, would have to be replaced because: 
The demands on agricultural extension in the future will be different. 
In many cases production levels will have reached a plateau where 
increases in input will no longer result in economical returns. Not 
increased production but increased efficiency and profitability will be 
the demands of the future. . . . In such an agricultural system the 
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extension services will no longer distribute technical packages, but 
they will have to assist the farmers on issues of farm management, 
quality, marketing and environmental conservation. These issues will 
have to be taught differently and the instrument of the T&V system 
may no longer be adequate. Rather than teaching technology, the 
extension will have to raise awareness among its clients, affect their 
attitudes, broaden their understanding. For these tasks new tools will 
be required which will enable farmers to make qualified decisions 
rather than following instructions (Malaysian-German Pesticide Project 
1993: 198). 
Whereas the primary task of the T&V system had been to increase 
production via 'technology packages' taught to farmers through the 
extension system, the task was now to 'raise awareness among its 
clients, affect their attitudes', and 'broaden their understanding' so as 
to enable the farmers to make 'qualified decisions rather than fol- 
lowing instructions'. Ultimately, participatory training techniques 
'are more useful to motivate farmers than traditional teaching styles. 
Discussions and exchange of ideas with other farmers in a "field 
school" forum are more likely to change farmers' behaviour' (ibid.: 
198). Whether the participatory techniques have been effective in 
changing the attitude and behaviour of the Malaysian farmers in re- 
lation to pest control remains to be evaluated (ibid.: 198-203). But as 
realized by the MGPP, the individual farmer's concern for produc- 
tion costs, short-term profit and the lack of 'viable' alternatives pose 
strong limitations to changes in his practices. 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the participatory 
techniques is not their ability to generate the intended objectives, 
but the sophisticated manner in which an attempt is made to 
govern the farmer's thinking and behaviour. On the one hand, the 
participatory techniques may not differ much from the Training and 
Visit system, which has been utilized more or less unaltered since the in- 
troduction of modern pest control by the colonial administration at the 
beginning of the century (cf. Annual Reports of the Department of 
Agriculture). After all, both sets of techniques aim not only to change the 
behaviour and practices of the farmer, but also to instil in him a change 
in his 'attitude' and 'understanding'. In the first case this was supposed 
to impose on the 'indolent' and 'conservative' farmer a progressive, 
industrious and modern attitude; in the second case an attitude and 
understanding for safety, health and environmental concerns. 
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On the other hand, the participatory training techniques aim to effect 
results in a much more sophisticated manner. Whereas the 
'traditional' T&V system in its most basic form aimed to increase 
production and productivity by unilateral lectures, introduction to 
preset solutions, and occasional visits by the Extension Officer, the 
participatory techniques aim to introduce new production standards 
of safety, health and the environment by discussions and exchange 
of ideas between farmers in field schools, games, brainstorming 
sessions and demonstrations (Malaysian-German Pesticide Project 
1993: 216). Perhaps the MGPP's characterization of the participatory 
techniques as delineating a 'people-centred' approach is not quite 
misplaced. Under the motto that the judicious practices should be 
demonstrated notfor, but by the farmers (ibid.: 215), the participatory 
techniques, by allowing the farmer to include knowledge and 
experience that he deems important, attempt to bring about the 
farmer's internalization of the desirable norms of safety, health and 
environment in a much more sophisticated manner than the T&V 
system. Perhaps Deputy Agriculture Minister, Alex Lee, when 
commenting on the farmers' misuse of pesticides leading to 
Singapore's import ban, was being overly modest when he said that 
'we can only give them guidance, advice and the benefit of our 
technical know-how' (cited in Sahabat Alam Malaysia 1987: 14). The 
participatory techniques introduced a few years later, whether 
successful or not, at least intended to instil in the farmers exactly 
what the Deputy Agriculture Minister had urged them to display, 
namely 'self-discipline' (ibid.: 14). 
Governing the pesticide users was not a task for state agencies 
alone. With the pressure rising for a ban on its 'main revenue earner' 
(ICI Agrochemicals Public Affairs Adviser Encik Khalid, cited in 
NST, 6.7.1988), ICI Agrochemicals decided in 1986 to initiate its 
'product stewardship programme' for the education of farmers and 
plantation workers handling pesticides. ICI Agrochemicals' 
definition of the programmes is: 'The responsible and ethical 
management of a product during its progress from invention to 
ultimate use and beyond' (ICI Agrochemicals 1994). However, if 
'carelessness', 'abuse' and 'misuse' of pesticides during its application 
were to be avoided, it was necessary to control not only the 
properties of the product, but also the behaviour of the individuals 
applying the product. What was to be managed, then, was not only 
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the bio-chemical properties of the product, but also the 'knowledge', 
'attitude' and physical practices of the farmers and plantation workers. 
Consequently, a series of educational techniques was deployed. 
The first step taken by ICI Agrochemicals was to distribute 1,000 
videotapes free of charge on the 'proper' handling of pesticides (MM, 
12.12.1986). A nation-wide programme to educate estate workers 
was launched in December 1986. Field personnel, including a doctor, 
were supposed to visit 600 plantations to give talks on the 'proper' 
way of handling pesticides (MM, 12.12.1986). To what extent these 
plans were implemented remains uncertain, but by 1988 the efforts 
included competitions on how to store and use pesticides in the 
safest way, and visits by two doctors to about 200 estates annually 
(NST, 6.7.1988). A campaign was launched in 1989 to motivate the 
plantation workers on the 'habit' of reading product labels before 
purchase and use (BT, 23.5.1994). Three more elements were added 
to ICI's safety campaign in 1992. First, the preparation and 
distribution of 30,000 pictogram posters. By using small-scale 
pictures depicting real work situations, the posters aimed to make 
accessible to the often illiterate plantation worker the safe and 
proper use of pesticides. Second, a pesticide guidebook The 
Adventures of the Grow Safely Team aimed at schoolchildren, was to be 
distributed to at least 200 rural schools. Third, the Incentivized 
Learning Programme, targeted towards adult end-users of pesticides, 
consisted of various competitions and premiums related to the 
understanding of the pictogram posters (Star, 17.7.1992). 
The educational programmes undertaken by ICI Agrochemicals, 
though no doubt the most comprehensive and enduring ones, were 
not the only programmes undertaken by the pesticides industry. The 
Malaysian Agricultural Chemicals Association (MACA) launched 
several initiatives from 1985, some independently and some in 
cooperation with ICI Agrochemicals. The four-day seminar 'Training 
of Trainers in Safe and Effective Agrochemicals Use' conducted in 
1985, was the first step taken by MACA, and aimed to 'create a pool 
of knowledgeable trainers who can educate Malaysians on the 
"proper" use of agrochemicals' (BT, 21.5.1991). MACA's efforts 
remained, however, on a rather limited scale until 1992, when a 
comprehensive programme was drawn up to educate more than 
500,000 farmers on the correct use of chemicals (Star, 20.1.1992). 
Finally, it should be mentioned that Hoechst Malaysia's Agricultural 
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Division by the early 1990s was organizing several hundred 
dialogue sessions with the farmers to educate end-users on the safe 
handling of pesticides (BT, 12.8.1994). In sum, educational 
techniques were a crucial modality to instil in the minds of the 
farmers and plantation workers an 'attitude' and 'understanding' of 
the necessity and desirability of applying pesticides in a 'judicious' 
and 'proper' manner. The effectiveness of the educational 
programmes in fulfilling their stated intentions remains unclear, and 
it has not been part of this article to try to evaluate this. What is clear 
though is that many NGOs claimed that the educational 
programmes were insufficient, in that they did not reach the 
majority of small farmers, and that many of those farmers who 
actually did participate in the programmes continued to utilize 
pesticides in an unsafe manner. More importantly, although 
education and training by many NGOs were seen as inadequate, and 
calls were made for more strict legislation and even the outright 
banning of pesticides, it seems that nobody ever contested the 
desirability and necessity of teaching the farmers and plantation 
workers how to apply pesticides in a 'safe' and 'efficient' manner. 
Education and training, in this way, had a strong legitimizing effect 
on the continued use of pesticides. 
Monitoring Pesticides in Food 
If education and training, as illustrated above, came to be seen as a 
necessary means to ensure the enhancement of 'knowledge' and 
'understanding' of proper and safe use of pesticides, the doubt 
persisted whether that would suffice to bring about the desirable 
'attitude', 'determination', or 'will' on behalf of the farmers and the 
plantation workers to ensure that the procedures prescribed were 
actually complied with. A Malaysian Agricultural Research and 
Development Institute researcher argued at the 'Seminar on Safe 
Handling and Efficient Utilization of Pesticides' that 'knowing and 
understanding alone does not guaranty [sic!] that pesticide 
application will be carried out in a safe and efficient manner. It 
demands will and determination on the farmer's or estate worker's 
part to do it right, which is something neither you nor I can be sure 
of' (Mamat 1989). In other words, the problem lay not so much with 
pesticides as a product as with the way that farmers and plantation 
workers were applying them. 
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The MGPP likewise acknowledged that education was necessary but 
insufficient. Thus, it was realized that the farmers might neglect 
consumer safety 'despite knowledge'. But in contrast to the rather 
voluntaristic and disarming reason for this given by the researcher 
from the Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development 
Institute, the reasons suggested by MGPP were more susceptible to 
governmental intervention. Thus, the MGPP viewed the neglect of 
consumer safety despite knowledge to have two causes: offences are 
not detected, and profit is too strong an incentive. Although both 
these problems were acknowledged to be difficult to solve, they 
were none the less conceived to be susceptible to management. It 
was thus suggested that by building up technical capacity to facilitate 
the chemical analysis of pesticide residues in food samples, the 
monitoring and control of marketed food could be improved. 
Improved analytical capacity would at the same time target both the 
problem of detecting 'offences' of excessive levels of pesticide residues 
in food, and the problem of a 'too strong profit incentive', because: 
If properly introduced and enforced, the new standards [of safety 
and quality] would then apply to all farmers equally and would not 
affect the individual's competitiveness. Only when the compliance 
of these safety and quality standards is left to the discretion of 
individual farmers will economic implications affect his decisions. 
The adoption of pesticide safety and quality recommendations is 
therefore more a measure of the prevailing enforcement climate 
than of their economic impact on the farm budget (Malaysian- 
German Pesticide Project 1993: 193). 
In other words, if the grid of control established through the monitoring 
of pesticide residues were made sufficiently impervious and uniform, 
the farmers would compete on equal terms at a higher level of safety. 
Consequently, the economic incentive for the individual farmer not to 
comply with the standards would be eliminated. 
A fully equipped pesticide residue laboratory was established in 
Kuala Lumpur between 1984 and 1990 under the auspices of the 
Pesticide Section: after the setup of the Toxicology Unit in 1986, 
facilities to perform basic toxicological work were installed during 
1987 (Malaysian-German Pesticide Project 1993: 88). By 1990 the 
laboratory had the capacity to analyse pesticide residues in food for 
about 70 active ingredients, including nearly all pesticides classified 
as 'extremely' or 'highly' hazardous by the WHO and registered for 
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use in Malaysia (ibid.: 77). Two more laboratories were established in 
Sabah and Sarawak between 1990 and 1992, and by the end of 1993 
the three laboratories had a combined instrumental capacity of 
approximately 20,000 analyses per year, though the number of 
analyses which were actually conducted was significantly lower 
(ibid.: 185-86). The skills of laboratory personnel, made up by several 
chemists and laboratory assistants, were upgraded through specific 
training in analytical methods both locally and overseas (ibid.: 77). 
The Ministry of Agriculture was not the only government body 
involved in the monitoring of pesticide residues in food. When in late 
1986 the formal responsibility for controlling pesticide residues in food 
was transferred from the Pesticides Board to the Food Quality Control 
Unit under the Ministry of Health, the latter Unit began to undertake 
the annual collection of several thousand food samples. These were 
submitted for testing to the Chemistry Department to see if the level of 
pesticide residues in the samples exceeded the Maximum Residue 
Levels, as defined in the Food Regulations 1985. On identification of any 
illegal residues in the samples, the Chemistry Department would issue 
analyst certificates to the Food Quality Control Unit for use in legal 
action (MACA Nausletter, 4 (3) 1991). However, legal prosecution and 
conviction seem to have been utilized in very few cases. While the 
political cost to the government was no doubt a major reason for the 
Ministry of Health's reluctance to prosecute farmers, the technical 
obstacles to trace the particular farmer 'abusing' pesticides came to be 
seen as a pressing issue. 
Enforcement: Tagging of Food 
If monitoring had contributed to the visibility of the problem of 
pesticide residues in food, the question remained of how to ensure 
that pesticides were applied in a 'judicious' manner to prevent 
infringements of the Maximum Residue Levels, as defined in the 
Food Regulations. In contrast to the plantation worker, who works 
under the supervision of an estate management and has little 
incentive to apply pesticides in a manner that would endanger either 
his own or others' health, the individual farmer whose agricultural 
practices are subject to infrequent checks by the Extension Officers, 
and whose 'motivation' is the quest for short-term profit, was seen as 
a far greater problem (cf. van Vreden and Ahmadzabidi 1986: 30; 
Malaysian-German Pesticide Project 1993). The many concerns voiced 
by the leading newspapers and the NGOs suggested that neither 
Peter Triantafillou 
education nor occasional testing of the farmer's produce was seen as 
a sufficient guarantee for the avoidance of excessive residue levels. 
What was needed was a more effective system of deterrence: a 
system which would facilitate a speedy detection of pesticide 
'misuse' by the farmer. 
It remains obscure when the idea of tagging or labelling marketed 
food produce was first introduced, but when Singapore rejected 
Malaysian vegetables the suggestion was posed from several 
locations. For instance, a spokesman for the University Pertanian 
Malaysia's Centre for Agricultural Policy Studies suggested 
compulsory labelling of every container of vegetables as a first step 
towards grading Malaysia's vegetable exports. The labels should list 
the origin, producer's name, type and grade of vegetables, volume 
and date of packing. He argued that labelling would increase 
marketing efficiency and facilitate quality-control monitoring. The 
spokesman added that the 'sloppy' and 'loose' control of edible 
products was detrimental to the national image and, unless speedily 
and rigorously corrected, could adversely affect Malaysia's 
competitive edge (Star, 16.3.1987). 
A tagging system was introduced in July 1987 for vegetables 
grown in the Cameron Highlands designated for export to 
Singapore. The initiative was supported by the leading newspapers. 
For instance, New Straits Times said that: 'One might go so far as to 
even advocate organic farming . . .', but that '[tlhe goal for the 
moment should be to enforce these new rules and bring the errant 
farmers to book. This can only be done by constant spot checks' 
(NST, 16.7.1987). The fact that the tagging system applied only to 
produce exported to Singapore and not to produce designated for 
domestic consumption was criticized by a number of NGOs. 
Moreover, newspaper articles throughout the early 1990s regularly 
reported claims of the excessive levels of pesticide residues in 
vegetables and other foodstuffs due to the farmers' 'indiscriminate' 
use of pesticides, and argued for the 'need to monitor pesticides in 
food' (e.g. BT, 25.9.1991; Star, 30.3.1992; MM, 29.4.1992; NST, 
16.2.1993; NST, 15.3.1994). 
The first initiative to implement a tagging system for vegetables 
designated for domestic consumption was announced by the 
manager of Selayang wholesale market, the key distribution centre 
for vegetables marketed for Kuala Lumpur and Selangor. The 
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manager announced that by September (1994) sellers would have to 
fill in new forms with details about chemical spraying, name and 
address of the farmer, date of harvest, etc.: 'With this information we 
shall be able to nail anybody selling vegetables contaminated with 
pesticides', because of a new laboratory that could supply the 
authorities with'fast test results (NST, 4.4.1994). The following year 
saw the adoption of the Vegetable Marketing (Amendment) Regulations 
1995. Director of Licensing of the Federal Agricultural Marketing 
Authority (FAMA), Ishak Abbas, said that once the Regulations 
came into force, officers from FAMA would conduct spot checks of 
xr~crotah loc  at co&ctizrL ~ep,fres e y E r e  they urn- +nrrrrnJ- 
' -6-'""'-" 1" L1L C U 6 6 C U .  
'Only genuine farmers who are registered with the department can buy 
them. Farmers will have to fill in their names, identity card number, 
address and name of the vegetable on the tag.' On the functioning of the 
system, Ishak Abbas said that purchasers would be fined if the 
vegetables they bought were not tagged. This form of 'indirect 
enforcement', argued Ishak, 'is a more effective method of enforcement 
as the purchasers will ensure that the vegetables are tagged by farmers 
so they (purchasers) will not get into trouble' (NST, 10.4.1995).7 
It has not been possible to analyse the effects of the system as the 
Vegetable Marketing (Amendment) Regulations 1995 were still awaiting 
implementation at the end of 1995. While it would be a rather futile 
attempt to speculate on the consequences that may be generated by 
this system, it seems appropriate to make a few remarks on the 
intended functioning of the system. 
First of all the big advantage of the system, from the perspective of 
governing the farmers, is the huge potential for the centralization of 
control. Before 1987 the monitoring of the farmers' practices 
consisted in occasional visits by the agricultural Extension Officer. 
The introduction of more systematic collection of food samples for 
chemical analysis in 1987 did not change this mode of control 
significantly, because although the likelihood of detecting 
contaminated food increased, it was virtually impossible to trace the 
farmer who had delivered the contaminated produce. Ultimately, 
then, to ensure that the farmer in spite of unfavourable economic 
incentives applied pesticides 'judiciously', the control had to take 
place in the fields of each of the approximate 500,000 individual 
farmers at the exact moment when the pesticide was being applied; 
indeed, a hopeless task. In contrast, the tagging system allows 
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control to be undertaken at a limited number of wholesale and retail 
markets. If enforced, the tag applied to each basket/container of 
food brought to the market by the farmer will allow for the 
unambiguous identification of the source of the produce. The 
combination of centralized control and unambiguous identification 
of the 'errant' farmer should make tagging both more efficient (in 
that the enforcement costs of the tagging system are far lower than 
for the extension system), and more effective (in that constant, 
uninterrupted and individualizing surveillance of the farmers' 
application of pesticid& replaces the irregular visits by the Extension 
Officers and the collection of test samples, which only with great 
difficulty could be traced back to the individual farmer). 
In short, substantial efforts were made during the 1980s to 
improve and expand the analysis and monitoring of pesticide 
residues in food, that is, to make visible the problem of pesticide 
residues in food. Chemical analysis and extensive monitoring would 
make it possible to enforce higher safety, health and environmental 
standards, that is, to sustain a desirable 'enforcement climate' that 
would enable the governing of the farmers' use of pesticides 
(Malaysian-German Pesticide Project 1993: 193). When monitoring 
turned out to be insufficient in controlling the problem of pesticide 
residues in food, a new technique, tagging, was developed to 
monitor the farmers' practices. From a historical perspective, it is 
hard to ignore the irony related to the changing 'need' to regulate the 
farmers' agricultural practices. Until two or three decades ago the 
farmer was conceived as indolent and conservative, and in need of a 
sense of productiveness and motivation regarding modern 
modalities of pest control; now the farmer, allegedly driven by 'too 
strong profit incentives' is seen to be in 'need' of re-education and 
subjection to what its proponents would like to be a panoptic 
apparatus, monitoring and controlling his conduct. 
Conclusion 
The transformation of bio-power in relation to the recasting of 
development discourses between 1945-55 made the issue of public 
health an object of knowledge and regulatory policy. This was a 
crucial precondition for the subsequent attempts to know, govern and 
contest the use of pesticides. In this process, scientific discourses came 
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to play an important role in attempts to validate and invalidate 
arguments for and against the use of pesticides. The effect was to 
create a politics of expertise which, in effect, restricted the way that the 
use of pesticides could be contested. Moreover, the categories and 
assumptions in toxicological discourses pointed to the possibility of 
the continued use of pesticides in a controlled and safe manner. To 
avoid any misunderstanding: my argument is not that toxicological 
and medical discourses 'in themselves' determine whether or not 
pesticides are used and how this takes place. As illustrated above, 
these discourses have served both to legitimize claims for the 
continued use of pesticides, and to substantiate claims sriticizing the 
use of pesticides. Rather the point is that these discourses - by 
producing certain techniques, such as controlled experiments and 
diagnostics, and certain notions such as hazard, Acceptable Daily 
Intake and Maximum Residue Levels - render possible certain modes 
of governing and managing the use of pesticides. 
For the governmental rationalities displayed in relation to pest 
control, any obstacle to the achievement of a specified end had a 
technical solution. Should this solution have undesirable side-effects, 
such as the making of modem farmers driven by 'too strong profit 
incentives' and the poisoning of man and the environment by 
pesticides, new technical devices could be developed to deal with 
these issues as well. The curious thing, then, is not that plans, policies, 
laws and programmes, such as the Green Revolution, sometimes had 
quite horrifying unintended effects, but that in spite of this, 
governmentalities not only prevailed but became increasingly 
pervasive in relation to pests in agriculture. Thus, from the mid-1980s, 
the governing of men and pests in relation to each other was no longer 
a matter exclusively for the state: the NGOs pointed at the necessity of 
government to educate, monitor and control the use of pesticides so as 
to improve public health and safety, and the pesticide industry 
actually undertook the task of educating and training the farmers and 
the plantation workers in order to regulate their behaviour. An 
important effect of these initiatives was to justify the continued use of 
pesticides. More generally, the programmes and techniques deployed 
to protect public health from the adverse effects of the use of 
pesticides in Malaysian agriculture illustrate that modem 
governmentalities do not necessarily require a state apparatus to be 
translated into disciplinary practices. 
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NOTES 
The notion of rationality is not utilized 
in the Weberian sense. Thus, there is no 
attempt here to uphold a typological 
division between formal and 
substantive rationality; nor does it refer 
to an abstract and inevitable process of 
formal rationalization of modem 
society (the 'iron cage'); and nor does it 
- and this is the most imvortant 
difference - refer to the unitary and 
transcendental notion of Western 
rationalism. Rather, the term is utilized 
in a plural and instrumental sense. That 
is, rationalities are analysed as a 
multiplicity of means-end relations 
inscribed and articulated through 
concrete practices (cf. Foucault 1991a: 
79). 
From 1985 to 1990 the enactment of a 
set of legally binding regulations, The 
Highly Toxic 'Pesticides Regulations, 
became an issue of major dispute. 
Under intense pressure from the NGOs 
and the media, the Pesticides Board 
under the Ministry of Agriculture 
drafted in 1985 the Highly Toxic 
Pesticides Regulations to force estate 
owners to provide better access to 
safety equipment and medical check- 
ups for the plantation workers. Due to 
severe opposition from the 
pesticide industry and the estate asso- 
ciations, the Regulations were not 
implemented until 1996 and then only 
in a strongly modified version. 
Unfortunately this article leaves no 
place to analyse the struggle over these 
regulations. 
Malaysian Newspapers: 
BT: Business Times 
MM: Malay Mail 
NST: New Straits Times 
Star: The Star 
3 Guidelines on Toxicological Data Re- 
quirement for Pesticide Registration 
1993: 1. 
4 Established in 1982 to 'end pesticide 
damage and support reliance on safe, 
sustainable pest management', PAN is 
an international network which by the 
early 1990s linked some 400 NGOs in 
60 countries in both North and South. 
PAN coordinates campaigns on pesti- 
cides and their alternatives, and 
undertakes systematic documentation 
pertaining to scientific research on the 
effects of pesticides (and their 
alternatives) and the regulatory 
measures undertaken by national 
governments to control pesticides 
(PAN North America 1995). 
5 This point is inspired by Martin Hei- 
degger's reflections in The Age of the 
World Picture (1977). 
6 Apparently the Ministry of Agriculture 
in 1984 launched a nation-wide 
campaign to educate fanners and 
plantation workers on the safe use of 
pesticides. However, material 
describing the campaign has not been 
published. 
7 The article in the New Shzrits Times 
refers erroneously to the Vegetable 
Marketing (Amendment) Regulations 1995 
as the 'Fruit and Vegetable (Packing, 
Labelling and Grading) Regulations 
1995'. 
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